On resilience and connectivity of secure wireless sensor networks under
  node capture attacks by Zhao, Jun
PUBLISHED IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 1
On resilience and connectivity of secure wireless
sensor networks under node capture attacks
Jun Zhao, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Despite much research on probabilistic key predis-
tribution schemes for wireless sensor networks over the past
decade, few formal analyses exist that define schemes’ resilience
to node-capture attacks precisely and under realistic conditions.
In this paper, we analyze the resilience of the q-composite
key predistribution scheme, which mitigates the node capture
vulnerability of the Eschenauer–Gligor scheme in the neighbor
discovery phase. We derive scheme parameters to have a desired
level of resiliency, and obtain optimal parameters that defend
against different adversaries as much as possible. We also show
that this scheme can be easily enhanced to achieve the same
“perfect resilience” property as in the random pairwise key
predistribution for attacks launched after neighbor discovery.
Despite considerable attention to this scheme, much prior work
explicitly or implicitly uses an incorrect computation for the
probability of link compromise under node-capture attacks and
ignores real-world transmission constraints of sensor nodes.
Moreover, we derive the critical network parameters to ensure
connectivity in both the absence and presence of node-capture
attacks. We also investigate node replication attacks by analyzing
the adversary’s optimal strategy.
Index Terms—Security, resilience, connectivity, wireless sensor
networks, key predistribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) deployed in hostileenvironments are subject to adversary attacks that
can lead to sensor capture [7], [8], [11], [17]. Sensors are
particularly vulnerable to such attacks because their physical
protection is limited by low-cost considerations and their
operation is unattended [7], [11], [29]. As a result of such
attacks, all secret keys of a captured node are discovered by
an adversary. Although random key predistribution schemes
can be successfully used to secure communications in WSNs,
they are often not explicitly designed to address node-capture
vulnerabilities, and hence their resilience to such attacks is
seldom analyzed formally. The main goal of this paper is to
provide precise analytical results for resilience to node capture
of one of the best known random key predistribution schemes,
namely the q-composite extension of the basic Eschenauer and
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Gligor scheme [17] (hereafter referred to as the EG scheme),
which was proposed by Chan et al. [8].
Background. The EG scheme [17], which is widely con-
sidered to be the basic random key predistribution mechanism,
works as follows. For a WSN with n nodes, in the key predis-
tribution phase, a large key pool consisting of Pn cryptographic
keys is used to select uniformly at random Kn distinct keys
for each sensor node. These Kn keys constitute the key ring
of a sensor, and are installed in the sensor’s memory. After
deployment, two sensors establish secure communication over
an existing link if and only if their key rings have at least
one key in common. Common keys are found in the neighbor
discovery phase whereby a random constant is enciphered in
all keys of a node and broadcast along with the resulting
ciphertext block in a given area limited by the transmission
power/range; i.e., in a local neighborhood. Pn and Kn are
both functions of n for generality, with the natural condition
1 ≤ Kn ≤ Pn.
According to the q-composite extension of the EG scheme
[8], a secure link between two sensors is established if they
share at least q key(s) in their key rings, where 1 ≤ q ≤ Kn.
Clearly, the q-composite scheme with q = 1 reduces to the
EG scheme. The q-composite scheme with q ≥ 2 outperforms
the EG scheme in terms of resilience (defined below) to
small-scale sensor capture attacks while trading off increased
vulnerability in the presence of large-scale attacks.
In addressing the resilience to node-capture attacks, we
adopt the metric proposed by Chan et al. [8] where an adver-
sary captures some random set of m nodes. Communication
between two arbitrary nodes, which are not among these m
nodes and have a secure communication link in between,
may still be compromised (in particular be decrypted) by the
adversary under the EG scheme and its q-composite version
due to key collisions that can be generated during the predis-
tribution phase. Thus, capturing nodes enables an adversary
to compromise communications between non-captured nodes
which happen to use keys that are also shared by captured
nodes. We denote the probability of such compromise by
pcompromised and, following Chan et al. [8], we say that a
random key predistribution scheme is “perfectly resilient” to
node-capture attacks if pcompromised = 0. This implies that
only communications between a captured node and its direct
neighbors are compromised in a perfectly resilient scheme.
Hence, analysis of prefect resilience of a scheme must ac-
count for the number of neighbors of any captured node
(e.g., minimum, average) to assess inherent vulnerability to
node capture. Specifically, resilience analysis must explicitly
address the connectivity property of a key graph arising from
a key predistribution scheme under the classic disk model
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of communication [12], [21], [22], [31], which enables the
computation of the number of neighbors of a captured sensor
under realistic transmission constraints.
B. Motivation
Why the q-composite scheme matters?
Although many key predistribution schemes have been
proposed in the literature [3], [5], [14], [15], [23], we explain
that the q-composite scheme matters as follows.
¬ Although there are other key predistribution schemes that
by design are perfectly resilient after the neighbor discovery
phase, the basic EG scheme and q-composite scheme can also
be easily extended to be perfectly resilient after the neighbor
discovery phase.
­ Schemes are still vulnerable during the neighbor discovery
phase, even being perfectly resilient after the neighbor discov-
ery phase. In terms of resilience against node capture during
the neighbor discovery stage, the q-composite scheme often
outperforms the EG scheme and many other schemes.
We now discuss the above points ¬ and ­ respectively.
We look at ¬ first. Although the basic EG scheme and the
q-composite scheme are not perfectly resilient, they can be
easily extended to become perfectly resilient after neighbor
discovery. For example, after the neighbor discovery phase
of the EG scheme ends and two neighbor nodes identified
by IDi and IDj discover that they share key kij , they can
each compute a new shared key Kij = hash(IDi||IDj ||kij),
where i < j and hash(·) is a cryptographic hash function
with pseudo-random output, and erase the old key kij . Kij
is statistically unique (i.e., up to the birthday bounds) and
hence the EG scheme becomes perfectly resilient by the
above definition. Clearly, its q-composite version also becomes
perfectly resilient if we include the uniquely ordered q keys
in the hash operation instead of the single key kij .
We now explain the above point ­. The q-composite
scheme increases [8] the resilience of the EG scheme in the
neighbor discovery phase where perfect resilience cannot hold;
i.e., when pcompromised > 0. This is important since many
random key predistribution schemes are also vulnerable to
node capture in their neighbor-discovery phase even when
they are perfectly resilient after neighbor discovery, and yet
their vulnerabilities cannot be easily mitigated. For example,
the random pairwise-key predistribution scheme of Chan et
al. [8] is perfectly resilient and yet vulnerable to non-local
communication compromise. In this scheme, prior to deploy-
ment, each sensor is matched up with a certain number of
other randomly selected sensors. Then for each pair of sensors
that are matched together, a pairwise key is generated and
loaded in both sensors’ key rings. After deployment, any two
nodes sharing a common pairwise key establish secure com-
munication in the actual neighbor-discovery phase. Following
neighbor discovery, each node erases its locally unused keys;
i.e., keys that are shared with remote sensors located outside
the transmission radius of a sensor. However, before these keys
are erased, an adversary can capture and use them in his/her
nodes strategically placed at various locations in the network to
establish connections to sensors that are unreachable to remote
legitimate neighbors; e.g., the adversary’s nodes can broadcast
encrypted messages at these locations, find and connect to
legitimate local sensor nodes.
Other pairwise predistribution schemes such as the ones by
Liu and Ning [23] are constructed on a polynomial-based key
predistribution protocol, while the scheme by Du et al. [15]
is built on a threshold key exchange protocol. Both schemes
exhibit the following threshold resilience property: after the
adversary has captured some m number of nodes, the fraction
of compromised communications among non-captured nodes
is close to 0 for m less than a certain threshold and sharply
grows toward 1 when m surpasses the threshold. The larger
m, the more sensor energy these schemes use for shared
key generation. Thus, these schemes are not applicable in
environments where m is on the order of tens and hundreds of
nodes. For this reason, threshold key predistribution schemes
are less relevant to our analysis, despite their other interesting
properties.
What are the limitations of prior work on the q-
composite scheme in the literature?
Since the introduction of the q-composite scheme, it has
received tremendous interest in the literature over the past
decade [3], [5], [6], [15], [23]. However, prior researches have
a few limitations which can be possibly addressed only via
very recent advances. We discuss these limitations in terms
of resiliency against node capture, network connectivity and
replication attacks, respectively.
• Resilience against node capture in much prior studies:
Incorrect analysis of link compromise. It was only recently
discovered [33] that the computation of the probability of
link compromise, pcompromised, was incorrectly computed more
than a decade ago by Chan et al. [8]. Hence, most prior
work [9], [23], [29]–[31] used the incorrect computation either
explicitly or implicitly, yielding inaccurate or even misleading
results.
• Connectivity analysis in much prior studies: No considera-
tion of transmission constraints, or relatively weak results
when there is consideration. The analysis of resilience
(even perfect resilience) of a scheme must account for the
number of neighbors of any captured node to assess inherent
vulnerability to node capture. Hence, resilience analysis must
explicitly address connectivity of a key graph arising from key
predistribution. This builds the connection between resilience
and connectivity. In fact, connectivity analysis of the secure
sensor network under key predistribution is also of significant
virtue in its own because network-wide communication re-
quires connectivity. Given the importance of network connec-
tivity, there have been considerable studies on this issue [2],
[12], [21], [22], [37]. However, few results address physical
transmission constraints because considering both the security
aspect (i.e., the key predistribution scheme) and transmission
constraints will render the study much more challenging.
Transmission constraints reflect real-world implementations of
WSNs in which sensors have limited transmission capabilities
so two remote sensors may not be able to communicate
directly. Even under the classic disk model of communication
where two sensors have to be within a certain distance
from each other to communicate, connectivity analysis of
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secure sensor networks is difficult. Because of the difficulty,
limited studies that consider secure connectivity under the disk
model all present quite weak results. Note that the topology
induced by the q-composite scheme is a key graph in which
each of n nodes selects Kn number of keys uniformly at
random from a common pool of Pn keys, and two nodes
establish an edge upon sharing at least q keys (we denote
the above key graph by Gq(n,Kn, Pn)). The disk model
induces the so-called random geometric graph in which any
two of n uniformly distributed nodes on an area A have
an edge in between if and only if their distance is at most
some value, say rn (we denote the above random geometric
graph GRGG(n, rn,A)). Then the topology of a secure sensor
network deploying the q-composite scheme under the disk
model is given by the intersection of the key graph and
the random geometric graph; i.e., a secure link exists only
when the two nodes have an edge in the key graph and also
have an edge in the random geometric graph. The reason
is that a secure link between two sensors require them to
share at least q keys and also to be within distance rn.
For this graph intersection Gq(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A),
due to the intertwining of the key graph and the random
geometric graph, it is extremely difficult to obtain strong
connectivity result. To illustrate the difficultly, we discuss a
related yet simper problem that had been open for 18 years.
Let us replace the key graph with a much simpler graph,
the renowned Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph [16] GER(n, pn), which
is defined on n nodes such that any two nodes establish
an edge in between independently with the same probability
pn. This graph is much simpler than the key graph because
it removes the edge dependencies [32]. Then we consider
the graph intersection GER(n, pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A). After
establishing connectivity result of GRGG(n, rn,A), Gupta
and Kumar [20] in 1998 proposed a conjecture for connec-
tivity of GER(n, pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A) (for the details of
this conjecture, see Page 4 where we discuss related work).
Despite many attempts to address this conjecture, it was
resolved by Penrose [26] not until 2016. The difficulty is to
analyze the connection structure when two distinct types of
random graphs intersect: even individual graphs are highly
connected, the resulting topology can become disconnected
after intersection. We resolve an analog of the above con-
jecture for connectivity in Gq(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A),
the intersection of the key graph and the random geometric
graph. In particular, we show the connectivity has a sharp
transition when the probability of a secure link is lnnn .
To summarize, our strong connectivity result of the studied
secure sensor network Gq(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A) is
not obtained in the literature due to the difficulty of analyzing
graph intersection. Prior results either ignore transmission
constraints to analyze just the key graph, or consider the graph
intersection but obtain relatively weak results (more details in
Section I-D).
• Node-replication attacks in prior studies: Lack of formal
or tractable analyses to determine the adversary’s optimal
strategy. Although our main focus is to analyze node-capture
resiliency and connectivity of the q-composite scheme, we
also discuss node-replication attacks on the scheme (following
Review 1’s suggestion). After node capture, the adversary
can deploy replica nodes of compromised nodes by ex-
tracting keys from compromised nodes and then inserting
some keys into the memory of replica nodes. Prior studies
have investigated node-replication attacks, but most researches
lacked formal analyses [10], [24], [38]. Limited studies have
formally addressed node replication, but existing expressions
to quantify node-replication attack are complex [19], making
it intractable to determine the adversary’s optimal strategy to
maximize node-replication attack given limited resource.
C. Summary of Our Results
Our main results can be summarized as follows:
• We analyze the q-composite scheme’s resilience against node-
capture attacks. We derive a tractable expression for the
fraction of compromised communications under node cap-
ture, identify scheme parameters to have a desired level of
resiliency, and obtain optimal parameters that defend against
different adversaries as much as possible.
• We study connectivity of sensor networks with the q-
composite scheme under real-world transmission constraints.
We derive the critical conditions to guarantee secure network
connectivity with high probability (i.e., with a probability
converging to 1 as the network size goes to infinity).
• For node-replication attacks, we investigate the adversary’s
optimal strategy.
D. Comparison with Related Work
We will first explain the improvements of this paper over
related studies, and then discuss additional related work.
Improvement over prior work in terms of resiliency
analysis against node capture. For a secure sensor network
using the EG scheme [17] (i.e., the q-composite scheme with
q = 1), Di Pietro et al. [13], [14] prove that if PnKn = Ω(n), the
network is resilient in the sense that an adversary capturing
sensors at random has to obtain at least a constant fraction
of nodes of the network in order to compromise a constant
fraction of secure links. We obtain the corresponding result
for general q. Chan et al. [8] show that for the q-composite
scheme, larger q outperforms smaller q in terms of resilience
against small-scale sensor capture attacks while trading off
increased vulnerability in the presence of large-scale attacks,
but no analytical result that identifies the optimal q is given.
Furthermore, their computation is shown to be incorrect by
Yum and Lee [33] recently. In contrast, we formally obtain
optimal q that defends against different adversaries as much
as possible. Although Yum and Lee [33] have provided the
correct expression to quantify node capture, but the expres-
sion is complex and intractable to analyze. We significantly
simplify the expression via an asymptotic analysis, and this
enables us to identify optimal scheme parameters.
Improvement over prior work in terms of connectiv-
ity analysis. Many studies on connectivity in secure sensor
networks ignore real-world transmission constraints [2], [8],
[12] because considering both the security aspect (i.e., the
key predistribution scheme) and transmission constraints will
render the analysis much more challenging. Because of the
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challenges, limited studies incorporating transmission con-
straints often present quite weak results [21], [22]. In the
special case of q = 1, Krzywdzin´ski and Rybarczyk [22], and
Krishnan et al. [21] recently show upper bounds 8 lnnn and
2pi lnn
n for the critical threshold that the edge probability (i.e.,
the probability of a secure link between two sensors) takes
for connectivity, while we prove the exact threshold as lnnn for
general q. The threshold is identified because we derive a sharp
zero-one law for connectivity. Intuitively, a sharp zero–one
law means that as the edge probability surpasses (resp., falls
below) the critical value and grows (resp., declines) further,
the network immediately becomes asymptotically connected
(resp., disconnected). Chan and Fekri [9] approximate the
key graph of the q-composite scheme by an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
graph. However, there is a lack of rigorous argument for
this approximation. A formal argument is needed because an
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph and a key graph used to represent the
q-composite scheme are quite different; e.g., edges are all
independent in the former but are not in the latter [4], [32],
[36]. In this paper, we rigorously bridge these two graphs (we
provide the details in Section VI of the full version [34] due
to space limitation).
Improvement over prior work in terms of replication
attack analysis. For node-replication attacks, prior researches
either lack formal analyses [10], [24], [38], or provide in-
tractable analyses [19]. We close this gap by presenting
a simple asymptotic analysis, which further enables us to
determine the adversary’s optimal strategy.
Other related studies. Key predistribution schemes by Liu
and Ning [23] and Du et al. [15] have the threshold behavior:
the probability of link compromise is close to 0 under small-
scale attacks but becomes close to 1 after more than a threshold
number of nodes are captured. Alarifi and Du [1] investigate
data and code obfuscation techniques to improve resilience
against node capture. Yang et al. [30] propose an approach of
binding keys to geographic locations to improve the resilience
against node capture. Defense mechanisms are also discussed
by Vu et al. [29]. Conti et al. [11] introduce techniques to
detect node-capture attacks. Bonaci et al. [7] apply control
theory to model network behavior under node capture. Tague
and Poovendran [28] evaluate node-capture attacks in sensor
networks by decomposing them into collections of primitive
events.
Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [16] analyze connectivity in the classical
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph [16] GER(n, pn) (the graph is named
after them), while Gupta and Kumar [20] address a random
geometric graph GRGG(n, rn,A). Both studies show that a
critical threshold of connectivity in either graph is that the edge
probability equals lnnn ; i.e., GER(n, pn) is connected (resp.,
disconnected) if pn ∼ a lnnn for some constant a > 1 (resp.,
some constant a < 1), while GRGG(n, rn,A) is connected
(resp., disconnected) if pirn2 ∼ a lnnn for some constant a > 1
(resp., some constant a < 1). Gupta and Kumar [20] conjec-
ture that the intersection GER(n, pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,D) will
also have a similar connectivity result where a critical thresh-
old of connectivity is that the edge probability pirn2pn equals
lnn
n . Despite the seemingly simple extension, the Gupta–
Kumar conjecture had been open for 18 years (1998–2016)
before being confirmed by Penrose’s recent ground-breaking
work [26].
E. Organization and Notation
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
We introduce useful notation below. In Section II, we analyze
the resilience of the q-composite scheme against node capture.
Section III presents connectivity results of a sensor network
under the q-composite scheme, in consideration of sensors’
limited transmission ranges. We quantify node-replication at-
tacks in Section IV. Section V provides analytical details for
resilience. We conclude the paper in Section VI.
Notation. Throughout the paper, q is an arbitrary positive
integer and does not scale with n, the number of nodes in
the sensor network. We define ps as the probability that the
key rings of two sensors share at least q keys in the q-
composite scheme, where the subscript “s” means “secure”.
ps is a function of the parameters Kn, Pn and q. All limits are
taken with n →∞. We use the standard asymptotic notation
o(·), O(·), ω(·),Ω(·),Θ(·) and ∼; see [35, Page 2-Footnote 1].
In particular, for two positive sequences xn and yn, the relation
xn ∼ yn signifies limn→∞(xn/yn) = 1.
II. RESILIENCE OF q-COMPOSITE SCHEME
AGAINST NODE CAPTURE
We now rigorously evaluate the resilience against node cap-
ture in sensor networks employing the q-composite scheme.
We consider the case where the adversary has captured some
random set of m nodes. Throughout the rest of the paper,
we let pcompromised denote the probability that secure commu-
nication between two non-captured nodes is compromised by
the adversary (we often refer to this probability as probability
of link compromise). Due to node homogeneity, pcompromised
is also the fraction of compromised communications among
non-captured nodes. In the work proposing the q-composite
scheme, Chan et al. [8] have already computed pcompromised.
Unfortunately, this computation, cited in numerous following
studies [9], [23], [29]–[31], is shown to be incorrect by Yum
and Lee [33] recently. Both the incorrect and correct formulas
are quite involved, so we defer presenting them to Section V-A.
Given the correct yet complex formula, it is still challenging to
interpret how pcompromised varies with respect to the parameters.
To this end, we significantly simplify pcompromised via an
asymptotic analysis, and this enables us to identify scheme
parameters to have a desired level of resiliency, and to choose
optimal parameters that defend against different adversaries as
much as possible. The intuition of our analysis is that although
pcompromised is complex for finite n, we manage to derive simple
asymptotic result of pcompromised. Despite simple asymptotics
obtained, the analysis to derive the result turns out to be non-
trivial since it involves significant simplification of a complex
expression.
A. Summary of Results
We now summarize the main results formally. First, we
identify the condition for negligible probability of link com-
promise, where a probability is negligible if it converges to 0
as n→∞.
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Theorem 1 (Conditions for negligible probability of link
compromise). The probability pcompromised of link compromise
is negligible if m
/(
Pn
Kn
)
is negligible. In other words, if
m = o
(
Pn
Kn
)
, (1)
then pcompromised = o(1).
Intuitively, Theorem 1 exhibits the following finding: to
compromise a constant fraction of communication links be-
tween non-captured nodes in the network, the adversary has
to capture at least some number of nodes such that these nodes
combined have a number of keys at least a constant fraction
of the key pool. An immediate implication of Theorem 1
gives the condition of scheme parameters to have a desired
level of resiliency: the adversary has to capture a constant
fraction of nodes in order to compromise a constant fraction
of communication links in the network. Specifically, we obtain
Corollary 1 below.
Corollary 1 (Scheme condition to achieve desired re-
siliency). If
Pn
Kn
= Ω(n), (2)
then the network has a desired level of resilience against
node capture in the sense that the adversary has to capture a
constant fraction of nodes in order to compromise a constant
fraction of communication links in the network. Put formally,
we have pcompromised = o(1) if m = o(n).
Theorem 1 above provides condition for pcompromised = o(1),
but there is no detailed expression of pcompromised. This is given
by Theorem 2 below, which establishes the asymptotically
exact probability of link compromise. Theorem 2 will enable
to us to optimize scheme parameters to defend against different
attackers.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic probability of link compromise).
Let the notation “∼” denote asymptotic equivalence. Specif-
ically, for two positive sequences xn and yn, the relation
xn ∼ yn means limn→∞(xn/yn) = 1. We also define ps
as the probability that the key rings of two sensors share at
least q keys. If
m = o
(√
Pn
Kn
2
)
, (3)
and
Kn = ω(1), (4)
then
pcompromised ∼
(
mKn
Pn
)q
, (5)
and
pcompromised
ps
∼ q!
(
m
Kn
)q
. (6)
Now we use Theorem 2 for optimizing scheme parameters
to defend against different adversaries. In particular, we will
consider two different adversaries and show how to choose the
key-sharing requirement q (two sensors should share at least
q keys in order to establish a secure link in between).
To see the impact of q on node-capture attacks, we will
fix the key ring size Kn and the key-setup probability ps.
This means that the key pool size Pn needs to decrease as
q increases. We first consider an adversary who has captured
a certain number of nodes, m. In other words, given m, we
study how pcompromised varies with respect to q. The result is
that there exists an optimal q to minimize pcompromised for an
adversary that has captured m nodes. More specifically, we
have the following Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 (Minimizing link compromise with respect to
q given the number of captured nodes). To minimize the
fraction of communications compromised by an adversary who
has captured m nodes, the optimal q is q∗ = max{⌊Knm ⌋, 1};
i.e., q∗ =
⌊
Kn
m
⌋
if Knm > 1, and q
∗ = 1 if Knm ≤ 1, where the
floor function bxc maps a real number x to the largest integer
that is no greater than x.
We then consider an adversary whose goal is to compromise
a certain fraction of communications. We show that there exists
an optimal q to maximize the number of nodes needed to be
captured by such an adversary (again, the key ring size Kn and
the key-setup probability ps are both fixed). More specifically,
we present Corollary 3 below.
Corollary 3 (Maximizing needed node capture with respect
to q given the fraction of link compromise). To maximize
the resource (specifically, to maximize the number of captured
nodes) needed for an adversary whose goal is to compromise
pcompromised fraction of communications, the optimal q is the
solution q# to maximize (pcompromised/psq! )
1/q . The solution q#
is difficult to derive formally, but can given empirically by
Table I and illustrated by Figure 1. The above result is
obtained by proving that the number of captured nodes needed
to compromise pcompromised fraction of communications equals
Kn × (pcompromised/psq! )1/q asymptotically.
TABLE I
THIS TABLE PRESENTS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
pcompromised
ps
AND q#
WHICH MAXIMIZES (
pcompromised/ps
q!
)1/q .
pcompromised
ps
[0.5,∞) [0.222, 0.5] [0.094, 0.222] [0.038, 0.094] [0.016, 0.038]
q# (i.e., optimal q) 1 2 3 4 5
pcompromised
ps
[0.0053, 0.016] [0.0023, 0.0053] [0.0009, 0.0023] . . .
q# (i.e., optimal q) 6 7 8 . . .
10−3 10−2 10−1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
pcompromised/ps
q #
0.016 0.038 0.094 0.2220.00530.0023
0.5
Fig. 1. The plot of q# with respect to pcompromised/ps, where q# maximizes
(
pcompromised/ps
q!
)1/q .
PUBLISHED IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 6
All of our results above will be proved in Section V-D.
We now discuss Theorem 2 in particular since it has a set of
seemingly complex conditions. Results other than Theorem 2
are less involved and have already been well explained.
B. Further Explanations of Theorem 2
We will interpret conditions and results of Theorem 2 for a
better understanding.
Interpreting (3) (i.e., m = o
(√
Pn
Kn2
)
). To provide a more
intuitive understanding, we discuss (3) below. To compute the
probability pcompromised of link compromise under m captured
nodes, Bayes’ rule is used by considering the number of
different keys in the key rings of the m captured nodes.
Specifically, after Aτ denotes the probability that the m
captured nodes have τ different keys in total, and Bτ denotes
the conditional probability of link compromise conditioning
on the event that the m captured nodes have τ different
keys in total, it is straightforward from Bayes’ rule that
pcompromised =
∑
τ (AτBτ ), where τ iterates its possible values;
i.e., Kn ≤ τ ≤ min{mKn, Pn}, which holds from the
following three points. First, Aτ is at least Kn because each
node already has Kn keys. Second, Aτ may take the maximum
mKn when the key rings of the m captured nodes are
completely different. Third, an additional note is that the above
maximum cannot exceed Pn since the whole key pool has Pn
keys. Now that given pcompromised =
∑
τ (AτBτ ), because Aτ
and Bτ have complex expressions, it makes difficult for us to
understand how pcompromised changes with respect to network
parameters and how we can choose parameters to minimize
pcompromised. In order to simplify computing pcompromised, we
want to provide a simple yet rigorous approximation. To start
with, we consider the distribution of τ , the number of different
keys in the key rings of the m captured nodes. Since we are
mostly concerned with the practical case where the key pool
size Pn is much larger than the key ring size Kn and the
captured-node number m, it is reasonable to consider that the
key rings of the m captured nodes are completely different
so that τ = mKn. We want to ensure this event with high
probability; i.e., the probability AmKn of this event can be
written as 1 − o(1) (arbitrarily close to 1 for large n). If
AmKn = 1− o(1), then any Aτ with τ < mKn will be o(1)
(i.e., negligible) since all Aτ sums to 1. In addition, clearly
Bτ increases as τ increases because link compromise is more
likely conditioning on that the m captured nodes have more
different keys in total. Given the above, if AmKn = 1− o(1),
recalling pcompromised =
∑
τ (AτBτ ), we can use AmKnBmKn
and furthermore BmKn to approximate pcompromised. Evaluating
BmKn is much simpler than computing all Aτ and Bτ ,
and we defer the discussion of BmKn next. Note that here
our explanation is intuitive (sometimes not rigorous), but we
present a rigorous analysis in Section V.
Now we return to how we can find a condition to ensure
AmKn = 1−o(1). The probability AmKn is the event that after
each captured node selects Kn keys uniformly at random from
the key pool of Pn keys, the total number of different keys
selected equals mKn. We first discuss a simple intuition using
the renowned “birthday paradox” [27]. In “birthday paradox”,
each of m persons has a birthday selected randomly from a
year (say P days), then it is well known that if m is on the
order of
√
P , at least two people celebrate the same birthday
with high probability; in contrast, if m is much smaller than√
P , all people have different birthdays with high probability.
This “birthday paradox” example corresponds to the special
case of key distribution where each node selects just one key
from the key pool (note that the notions of node and key
correspond to person and birthday). Hence, if Kn is just 1, we
know from the “birthday paradox” that if m is much smaller
than
√
Pn, all m captured nodes will have different keys with
high probability. Now for the general case where Kn is not 1,
the intuition thus becomes that if mKn is much smaller than√
Pn (formally mKn = o(
√
Pn)), all m captured nodes will
have different keys with high probability. In fact, this can also
be seen from a simple analysis. Without any restriction, there
are
(
Pn
Kn
)
ways to construct a key ring of each node, and thus[(
Pn
Kn
)]m
ways to construct the key rings of m nodes. Now for
the case where m captured nodes together have mKn different
keys, there are
(
Pn
Kn
)(
Pn−Kn
Kn
)
. . .
(
Pn−(m−1)Kn
Kn
)
ways to con-
struct the key rings, since the first node has
(
Pn
Kn
)
choices, the
second node has
(
Pn−Kn
Kn
)
choices in order to not share any
key with the first node, and so on. Then AmKn can be given
by
∏m−1
j=0 (
Pn−jKn
Kn
)
[(PnKn)]
m , and the result AmKn = 1 − o(1) under
mKn = o(
√
Pn) can be formally proved. The above condition
mKn = o(
√
Pn) is precisely (3) after simple arrangements.
To summarize, we introduce (3) so that the m captured
nodes together will have mKn different keys with high prob-
ability and then we only need to conditioning on this event to
provide a rigorous approximation for the probability of link
compromise.
Interpreting (5) (i.e., pcompromised ∼
(
mKn
Pn
)q). We have
explained above that the m captured nodes together will have
mKn different keys with high probability so that pcompromised =∑
τ (AτBτ ) can be approximated by BmKn , where BmKn
is the probability of event BmKn , with BmKn denoting the
event of link compromise conditioning on the event that the
m captured nodes have mKn different keys in total. We
now analyze BmKn by Bayes’ rule. Let CmKn,u denotes the
probability of event BmKn conditioning on the event that two
benign nodes share u keys in their key rings. Recall that ps
is the probability that two benign nodes share at least q keys
in their key rings (i.e., ps is the link-setup probability in the
q-composite scheme), and ρu denotes the probability that two
benign nodes share exactly u keys in their key rings. Given
there is already a link between two benign nodes, the probabil-
ity that they share exactly u keys is ρups . Given the above, we
obtain from Bayes’ rule that BmKn =
∑Kn
u=q(CmKn,u · ρups ).
In our studied parameter range, ρqps is much greater than
ρu
ps
with u > q; i.e., given there is already a link between two
benign nodes, then it is most likely that they share exactly q
keys rather than more than q keys. Hence, we only need to
evaluate link compromise in the case where the two benign
nodes share exactly q keys. Without any restriction, there are(
Pn
q
)
to select these q keys. To compromise this link, these q
keys must fall into the mKn keys that the m captured nodes
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together have, and there are
(
mKn
q
)
choices to select the q
keys. Then the link compromise probability becomes (
mKn
q )
(Pnq )
,
whose numerator and denominator become roughly 1q! (mKn)
q
and 1q!Pn
q respectively for mKn and Pn much greater than q.
Then we finally obtain the expression
(
mKn
Pn
)q
for pcompromised;
i.e., (5) follows.
Interpreting (4) (i.e., Kn = ω(1)). We need Kn = ω(1)
so that
(
mKn
q
)
above becomes 1q! (mKn)
q asymptotically.
Interpreting (6) (i.e., pcompromisedps ∼ q!
(
m
Kn
)q). We have
already interpreted (5) (i.e., pcompromised ∼
(
mKn
Pn
)q
) above.
Then (6) (i.e., pcompromisedps ∼ q!
(
m
Kn
)q
) follows from (5) and (35)
on Page 13 (i.e., ps ∼ 1q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
).
C. Practicality of the Conditions in the Results
We check the practicality of (2). Recall that n is the number
of sensors, the key ring size Kn controls the number of keys
in each sensor’s memory and Pn is the key pool size. In
real-world implementations of sensor networks, Kn is several
orders of magnitude smaller than Pn and n due to limited
memory and computational capability of sensors, and Pn is
larger [8], [17], [31] than n. Therefore, (2) is practical. In fact,
Di Pietro et al. [14] also consider the range of PnKn = Ω(n)
in the special case of q = 1. In addition, under (2) and a
reasonable assumption that only a small number (in particular
o(n)) of sensors are captured by the adversary, (1) follows
since any o(n) can be expressed as o
(
Pn
Kn
)
by (2).
For m ≥ 1, condition (3) implies Pn
Kn2
= ω(1); i.e., Kn
2
Pn
=
o(1). We check the practicality of (4) (i.e., Kn = ω(1)) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1). Since Kn is often larger than lnn in real-world
implementations [31], [36], the practicality of Kn = ω(1)
follows. As mentioned, Pn is much larger compared to Kn,
so Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) also holds in practice. In addition, to have an
idea of m in (3), we observe Kn is much less than n and Pn
is larger (but not too much) than n [8], [17], [31], so
√
Pn
Kn2
in (3) is often a fractional order of n. Under small-scale node-
capture attacks, m satisfies (3).
D. Experiments
We provide experiments to confirm our theoretical results.
1) Impact of scheme parameters to link compromise by
an adversary with a given number of captured nodes:
We present Figures 2 and 3 on Page 8 to illustrate the impact
of scheme parameters to link compromise by an adversary
with a given number of captured nodes. Each figure has four
subfigures. In each subfigure, we fix K and ps, and study
how pcompromised changes with respect to q for different m (we
often write Kn and Pn as K and P when not considering
their scalings with n). Across subfigures of either Figure 2 or
3, we consider different K, and across some subfigures, we
also have different sets of m for better discussion (explained
soon). Between Figures 2 and 3, we consider different ps.
Hence, our experiments and the resulting figure plots provide
a comprehensive study to validate our theoretical results.
In all 8 subfigures, we observe that:
¬ for each curve, pcompromised is indeed minimized at q =
max{⌊Km⌋, 1}, which confirms Corollary 2.
For the above point, our plots address the case of
⌊
K
m
⌋
being
an integer (e.g., K = 40 with m = 40, 20, 10 in Figure 2(b))
as well as the case where
⌊
Kn
m
⌋
is not an integer (e.g., K = 80
with m = 30 in Figure 2(c), and K = 120 with m = 50 in
Figure 2(d)). For this reason, some subfigures have different
sets of m. Furthermore, as explained below, we find that the
plots are in agreement with our asymptotic result (6) (i.e.,
pcompromised
ps
∼ q!( mKn )q):
­ Given q, K and ps, pcompromised increases with m. This can
be seen from that in each subfigure, curves with larger m are
always above curves with lower m.
® Given q, m and ps, pcompromised decreases with K. This can
be seen from that for either Figure 2 or 3, from subfigure (a)
to (d), the curves become lower and lower as K increases
(we compare curves with the same m).
¯ Given q, K and m, pcompromised increases with ps, This can
be seen from that the curves in Figure 2(a) (resp., (b) (c) (d))
are lower than those of Figure 3(a) (resp., (b) (c) (d)) (we
compare curves with the same m).
2) Impact of scheme parameters to the required number
of captured nodes by an adversary with a given fraction of
link compromise as its goal:
We further present Figure 4 on Page 8 to illustrate the
impact of scheme parameters to the required number of
captured nodes by an adversary whose goal is to compromise
a given fraction of links. Figure 4 has four subfigures. In each
subfigure, we fix K and ps, and study how m changes with
respect to q for different pcompromised. Between subfigures (a)
and (b) of Figure 4, we consider different ps with the same K
and the same set of pcompromised. Compared with subfigures (a)
and (b), we then consider a partially different set of pcompromised
as well as different ps in Figure 4(c). We further look at a
different K in Figure 4(d). Hence, our experiments here also
provide a comprehensive study.
In all 4 subfigures, we observe that:
° for each curve, m is maximized at Corollary 3’s q#, which is
determined by Table I or Figure 1 on Page 5 given pcompromisedps .
From Corollary 3, m denoting the number of captured nodes
needed to compromise pcompromised fraction of communications
equals K × (pcompromised/psq! )1/q asymptotically. Then
± Given K and ps, m increases with pcompromised. This can
be seen from that in each subfigure, curves with larger
pcompromised are always above curves with lower pcompromised.
² Given K and pcompromised, m decreases with ps. This can be
seen from that between subfigures (a) and (b) of Figure 4,
the curves become lower as ps increases (we compare curves
with the same pcompromised).
³ Given ps and pcompromised, m decreases with K. This can be
seen from that between subfigures (a) and (c) of Figure 4, the
curves become higher as K increases (we compare curves
with the same pcompromised).
Summarizing ¬–³ above, we conclude that the experiments
are in accordance with our theoretical findings.
III. CONNECTIVITY UNDER TRANSMISSION CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we investigate connectivity of secure sensor
network under transmission constraints.
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Fig. 2. Each subfigure plots the fraction of compromised communications between non-captured nodes, pcompromised, with respect to q when m nodes are
captured, and we fix K and ps in each subfigure. In different subfigures, we have different K and fix ps as 0.05. We observe that the q that minimizes
pcompromised is in accordance with Corollary 2; more specifically, the optimal q is max{
⌊Kn
m
⌋
, 1}, where the floor function bxc maps a real number x to the
largest integer that is no greater than x.
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Fig. 3. Each subfigure plots the fraction of compromised communications between non-captured nodes, pcompromised, with respect to q when m nodes are
captured, and we fix K and ps in each subfigure. In different subfigures, we have different K and fix ps as 0.1. Similar to Figure 2 above, we see that the
q that minimizes pcompromised is max{
⌊Kn
m
⌋
, 1} and thus in agreement with Corollary 2.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
q (key-sharing requirement)
pcompromised = 0.04
pcompromised = 0.03
pcompromised = 0.02
pcompromised = 0.01
K = 60
ps = 0.1
(a)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
q (key-sharing requirement)
pcompromised = 0.04
pcompromised = 0.03
pcompromised = 0.02
pcompromised = 0.01
K = 60
ps = 0.2
(b)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
q (key-sharing requirement)
pcompromised = 0.04
pcompromised = 0.03
pcompromised = 0.02
pcompromised = 0.01
K = 100
ps = 0.1
(c)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
q (key-sharing requirement)
pcompromised = 0.5
pcompromised = 0.4
pcompromised = 0.3
pcompromised = 0.2
K = 100
ps = 0.1
(d)
Fig. 4. The y axis stands for the number of nodes to be captured to ensure pcompromised fraction of compromised communications between non-captured
nodes. In each subfigure, different lines have different pcompromised, while different points in each line vary q while fixing K and pcompromised. We observe
that the q that maximizes m is in accordance with Corollary 3; more specifically, given
pcompromised
ps
, the optimal q is determined by Table I.
A. Modeling a Secure Sensor Network with the q-Composite
Scheme under Transmission Constraints
We consider an n-size secure WSN implementing the q-
composite key predistribution scheme. Let V = {v1,v2,. . . ,vn}
denote the set of sensors. Prior to deployment, each sensor
vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is assigned a key ring independently and
uniformly selected from all Kn-size subsets of a key pool
with size Pn. The q-composite scheme induces a key graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) (also known to a random intersection graph [3],
[18], [36]), defined on node set V such that any two distinct
nodes vi and vj (1 ≤ i < j ≤ n) establish an edge (an event
denoted by Kij) if and only if they possess at least q key(s)
in common.
After the key predistribution, sensors are deployed uni-
formly and independently in some network field A. To model
transmission constraints, we use the classic disk model [12],
[21], [22], [31] in which nodes vi and vj can communicate (not
necessarily securely) if and only if they are within distance rn
(an event denoted by Rij). The topology resulted from the disk
model is represented by a random geometric graph [21], [22],
[26] GRGG(n, rn,A).
In secure WSNs above with the q-composite scheme under
the disk model, nodes vi and vj establish a secure link if and
only if events Kij and Rij occur at the same time. Thus, the
intersection of graphs Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and GRGG(n, rn,A),
denoted by Gq(n,Kn, Pn, rn,A), represents the topology of
secure links. We consider A as a square of unit area and ignore
the boundary effect, so the square is essentially a torus T .
Then the network is modeled by graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, rn, T ).
In the rest of the paper, P[E ] denotes the probability that event
E happens.
B. Connectivity in the Absence of Node Capture
In the following Theorem 3, we present connectivity results
in the absence of node capture.
Theorem 3. In graph Gq(n, Kn, Pn, rn, T ) with rn ≤ 12 ,
Kn = ω(lnn), Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) and KnPn = o
(
1
n
)
, assume that
ps · pirn2 ∼ a · lnn
n
(7)
holds for some constant a > 0. Then as n→∞, we have
P
[
Gq(n,Kn, Pn, rn, T )
is connected.
]
→
{
0, if a < 1, (8a)
1, if a > 1. (8b)
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Remark 1. The term (7) is the edge probability of the
graph Gq(n, Kn, Pn, rn, T ) (i.e., the probability of a secure
link between two sensors). (8a) and (8b) constitute a sharp
zero–one law [25], [31] for connectivity, in the sense that
if the edge probability is slightly greater (resp., smaller)
than lnnn , the graph becomes connected (resp., disconnected)
quickly. This also implies that in the graph intersection
Gq(n, Kn, Pn, rn, T ), a critical threshold for connectivity
is given by the edge probability being lnnn . This result is
similar to that for the intersection of an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph
and a random geometric graph discussed on Page 4. In fact,
we will prove the one-law (8b) by bridging these two graph
intersections (the details are given in Section VI of the full
version [34] due to space limitation).
.
Remark 2. With ps · pirn2 in (7) replaced by 1q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
; i.e.,
with (7) replaced by
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
· pirn2 ∼ a · lnn
n
, (9)
and with all other conditions in Theorem 3 unchanged, then
as n→∞, (8a) and (8b) still follow. This result is true since
(9) and (35) on Page 13 clearly induce (7).
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Section VI of the full
version [34] due to space limitation.
C. Connectivity in the Presence of Node Capture
We now consider that the adversary has captured some
random set of m nodes, where m < n. Let the topol-
ogy formed by the (n − m) non-captured nodes be graph
Hq(n,m,Kn, Pn, rn, T ), which is statistically equivalent to
the random graph Gq(n − m,Kn, Pn, rn, T ) since the non-
captured nodes are uniformly distributed on T . Hence, by
replacing lnnn with
ln(n−m)
n−m in (7) of Theorem 3, we obtain
Theorem 4 below.
Theorem 4. In graph Hq(n,m,Kn, Pn, rn, T ) with rn ≤ 12 ,
Kn = ω(lnn), Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) and KnPn = o
(
1
n
)
, assume that
ps · pirn2 ∼ a · ln(n−m)
n−m (10)
holds for some constant a > 0. Then as n→∞, we have
P
[
Hq(n,m,Kn, Pn, rn, T )
is connected.
]
→
{
0, if a < 1, (11a)
1, if a > 1. (11b)
Remark 3. Similar to Remark 2, with ps·pirn2 in (10) replaced
by 1q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
; i.e., with (10) replaced by
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
· pirn2 ∼ a · ln(n−m)
n−m , (12)
and with all other conditions in Theorem 4 unchanged, then
as n → ∞, (11a) and (11b) still hold. This result follows
because (12) and (35) on Page 13 yield (10).
Based on our results, now we provide design guidelines of
secure sensor networks for connectivity.
Design guideline for connectivity in the presence/absence
of node capture: In an n-size secure wireless sensor network
employing the q-composite scheme with key ring size Kn and
key pool size Pn and working under the disk model in which
two sensors have to be within distance rn for communication,
• in the absence of node capture, from 1q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q ·pirn2 = lnnn
(i.e., replacing “∼” with “=” and letting a = 1 in (9)),
– the critical key ring size for connectivity is given by
(q!/pi)
1
2q
(
n−1 lnn
) 1
2qPn
1
2 rn
− 1q , (13)
– the critical key pool size for connectivity equals
(pi/q!)
1
q (n/ lnn)
1
qKn
2rn
2
q , (14)
– the critical transmission range for connectivity equals√
q! lnn/(pin) · (Pn/Kn2)q/2. (15)
• and if m nodes have already been captured, from 1q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q ·
pirn
2 = ln(n−m)n−m (i.e., replacing “∼” with “=” and letting
a = 1 in (12)),
– the critical key ring size for connectivity is given by
(q!/pi)
1
2q
[
(n−m)−1 ln(n−m)] 12qPn 12 rn− 1q , (16)
– the critical key pool size for connectivity equals
(pi/q!)
1
q [(n−m)/ ln(n−m)] 1qKn2rn 2q , (17)
– the critical transmission range for connectivity equals√
q! ln(n−m)/[pi(n−m)] · (Pn/Kn2)q/2. (18)
D. Practicality of Theorem Conditions
We check the practicality of conditions in Theorems 3
and 4. Since the whole region has a unit area, clearly the
condition rn ≤ 12 holds trivially in practice. Kn controls
the number of keys in each sensor’s memory. In real-world
implementations, Kn is often larger [31], [36] than lnn,
so Kn = ω(lnn) follows. As concrete examples, we have
ln 1000 ≈ 6.9, ln 5000 ≈ 8.5 and ln 10000 ≈ 9.2. Kn is
much smaller compared to both n and Pn due to constrained
memory and computational resources of sensors [8], [17], [31].
Thus, Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) and KnPn = o
(
1
n
)
hold in practice. Also,
Pn is larger [8], [14], [17] than n, so Pn = ω(n lnn) is
also practical. As examples, we have 1000 ln 1000 ≈ 6907,
5000 ln 5000 ≈ 42585 and 10000 ln 10000 ≈ 92103.
E. Experiments
We present experimental results below to confirm our the-
oretical results of connectivity. First, in the absence of node
capture, we study the connectivity behavior
• when K varies given different P in Figure 5(a) (on Page 11),
given different n in Figure 5(b), given different r in Figure
5(c), and given different q in Figure 5(d),
• when P varies given different K in Figure 6(a), given
different n in Figure 6(b), given different r in Figure 6(c),
and given different q in Figure 6(d),
• when r varies given different K in Figure 7(a), given different
P in Figure 7(b), given different n in Figure 7(c), and given
different q in Figure 7(d).
For each data point, we generate 500 independent samples of
Gq(n,K, P, r, T ), record the count that the obtained graph is
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connected, and then divide the count by 500 to obtain the
corresponding empirical probability of network connectivity.
In each subfigure, we clearly see the transitional behavior
of connectivity. Also, we observe that the probability of
connectivity
• increases with n (resp., K, r) while fixing other parameters,
• decreases with P (resp., q) while fixing other parameters,
Moreover, in each subfigure, the vertical line presents the
critical parameter for connectivity computed from Equations
(13) (14) and (15): the critical key ring size in Figures 5 (a)–
(d), the critical key pool size in Figures 6 (a)–(d), and the
critical transmission range in Figures 7 (a)–(d). Summarizing
the above, the experiments have confirmed our Theorem 3.
We then consider the presence of node capture to plot
Figures 8 (a)–(d) on Page 11. Given different m (the number
of captured nodes), we study the connectivity behavior when
K varies in Figure 8(a), P varies in Figure 8(b), and r varies
in Figure 8(c), where the data points are generated in the same
way descried above (i.e., deriving empirical probabilities from
500 samples). In each subfigure, the vertical line shows the
critical parameter for connectivity computed from Equations
(16) (17) and (18): the critical key ring size in Figure 8(a),
the critical key pool size in Figure 8(b), and the critical
transmission range in Figure 8(c). Furthermore, in Figure 8(d),
we vary m given different K. In all subfigures, we also observe
the transitional behavior of connectivity. Summarizing the
above, the experimental results have confirmed our Theorem
3. Figures 8 (a)–(d) have confirmed our Theorem 4.
IV. QUANTIFYING NODE-REPLICATION ATTACKS
A. Results
In secure sensor networks, a further attack following node
capture is the so-called node-replication attack [10], [19],
[24], [38]. The idea is that after node capture, the adversary
can deploy replicas of compromised nodes by extracting keys
from compromised nodes and then inserting some keys into
the memory of replica nodes. The resources quantifying the
adversary include the number of replicas deployed, and the
cost of each replica. To characterize the cost of each replica,
a simple metric is the number of keys inserted into its memory
(of course, this may not be precise, but it provides qualitative
intuition). The more a replica node cost, the more keys it
can store. For a resource-limited adversary, it has to tradeoff
between the number of replicas deployed, and the amount of
keys kept on each replica. Unfortunately, prior studies on node-
replication attacks lack of either formal or tractable analyses
[10], [19], [24], [38] to determine the adversary’s optimal
strategy. We closes this gap and present the following results:
(i) If c denoting the number of replicas decreases by a factor of
∆, then b denoting the amount of keys on each replica should
increase by a factor of q
√
∆ to achieve the same probability
of a successful replication attack.
(ii) If the adversary’s cost function cost(b, c) scales with bpbcpc
for some pb, pc, then the optimal (b, c) to maximize the
replication attack subject to the resource constraint bpbcpc ≤
budget, depends on how the ratio pb/pc compares with q.
Specifically, the optimal (b, c)
– is given by b = b pb√budgetc and c = 1 if pb/pc < q,
– is given by b = 1 and c = b pc√budgetc if pb/pc > q, and
– has many choices if pb/pc = q.
In practice, when we often have pb/pc < q (e.g., pb = 1,
pc = 1 and q > 1), then b = b pb
√
budgetc and c = 1
become optimal, meaning that the adversary should deploy
a small number of high-cost sensors, rather than deploy a
large number of low-cost sensors, to maximize the replication
attack under a budget.
We now explain the above results (i) and (ii). Let the
network density be d (for benign nodes), so that the adversary
can put a replica close to d benign nodes on average. We
compute the probability that a benign node shares at least q
keys with a replica (this will establish a secure link between
them and thus induce a successful replication attack). Note
that a benign node has Kn keys selected from the pool of Pn
keys, and a replica has d keys out of the same key pool. Then
the probability that a benign node shares exactly i keys with a
replica is (
b
i)(
Pn−b
Kn−i)
(PnKn)
(the idea is the benign node should have i
keys the same as the replica, and Kn−i keys from the (Pn−b)-
size key set in which the replica does not have a key. Then
the probability that a replica and a benign node share at least
(resp., less than) q keys is 1− α (resp., α), where we denote
q−1∑
i=0
(bi)(
Pn−b
Kn−i)
(PnKn)
by α for simplicity. Since there are c replicas
deployed, and each replica is neighboring d benign nodes on
average, then the probability of a successful replication attack,
defined as the probability that at least one replica and at least
one benign node establish a secure link, can be computed as
1−αcd. Similar to the result (35) on Page 13 for the link set-
up probability ps in the q-composite scheme, an asymptotic
result of α is 1− 1q! · b
qKn
q
Pnq
, which we prove in the full version
[34] due to space limitation (in fact, it is straightforward to
see that α is 1 − ps if b equals Kn). Hence, the probability
of a successful replication attack (denoted by preplication below)
asymptotically equals 1 − (1 − 1q! · b
qKn
q
Pnq
)cd, which further
becomes cdq! · b
qKn
q
Pnq
since the key pool size Pn is much greater
than b and Kn. Then we see that preplication scales linearly
with c, while scaling with bq . This implies result (i); i.e., if c
denoting the number of replicas decreases by a factor of ∆,
then b denoting the amount of keys on each replica should
increase by a factor of q
√
∆ to achieve the same probability of
a successful replication attack. We further obtain result (ii) by
considering that the resource-constrained adversary maximizes
bqc to maximize preplication, subject to the resource constraint
bpbcpc ≤ budget.
B. Experiments
We present experiments in Figures 9 (a)–(d) on Page 11
to confirm the above results on replication attacks. In Figures
9 (a) and (b), we vary c (the number of replicated nodes)
given different q and b to plot preplication. We consider node
density d = 1 in subfigure (a), and d = 8 in subfigure (b).
We also plot the horizontal line that corresponds to preplication
being 0.9. We take subfigure (a) as an example to validate our
result (i) above. In Figure 9(a), after c decreases by a factor
of ∆, then b should increase by a factor of q
√
∆ to achieve
the same preplication. Let c(b = 100) and c(b = 200) denote c
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Fig. 5. We plot the connectivity probability of the network Gq(n, K, P, r, T ) with the q-composite scheme under transmission constraints, with respect to
different key ring sizes K. Each vertical line presents the critical key ring size given by Eq. (13).
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Fig. 6. We plot the connectivity probability of the network Gq(n, K, P, r, T ) with the q-composite scheme under transmission constraints, with respect to
different key pool sizes P . Each vertical line presents the critical key pool size given by Eq. (14).
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Fig. 7. We plot the connectivity probability of the network Gq(n, K, P, r, T ) with the q-composite scheme under transmission constraints, with respect to
different transmission ranges r. Each vertical line presents the critical transmission range given by Eq. (15).
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Fig. 8. In the case where m nodes have already been captured, we plot the connectivity probability of the network Gq(n, K, P, r, T ) with the q-composite
scheme under transmission constraints. Each vertical line in subfigures (a) (b) and (c) presents the critical key ring size given by Eq. (13), the critical key
pool size given by Eq. (14), and the critical transmission range given by Eq. (15), respectively.
100 101 102
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
c (number of replicated nodes)
p
ro
b
.
of
re
p
li
ca
ti
on
at
ta
ck
q = 1, b = 200
q = 1, b = 100
q = 3, b = 200
q = 3, b = 100
K = 60
P = 104
(a)
100 101 102
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
c (number of replicated nodes)
p
ro
b
.
of
re
p
li
ca
ti
on
at
ta
ck
q = 2, b = 200
q = 3, b = 200
q = 2, b = 100
q = 3, b = 100
K = 60
P = 104
d = 8
(b)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
b (number of keys on a replicated node)
p
ro
b
.
of
re
p
li
ca
ti
on
at
ta
ck
q = 1
q = 2
q = 3
q = 4
q = 5
q = 6
K = 60
P = 104
c = 10
(c)
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
b (number of keys on a replicated node)
p
ro
b
.
of
re
p
li
ca
ti
on
at
ta
ck
q = 1
q = 2
q = 3
q = 4
q = 5
q = 6
K = 60
P = 104
c = 1
(d)
Fig. 9. Plots for node replication attacks. We set the density of benign nodes as d = 1 in subfigures (a) (c) and (d), while considering d = 8 in subfigure (b).
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corresponding to b = 100 and b = 100. Then for the upper
two lines in Figure 9(a), given q = 1, we compare c(b=100)c(b=200)
with 2, and the upper part of Table II shows they are actually
equal for the data points presented. For the lower two lines
in Figure 9(a), given q = 3, we compare 3
√
c(b=100)
c(b=200) with 2,
and the lower part of Table II shows they are quite close for
the data points presented. Hence, Table II has confirmed our
results on replication attacks.
In Figures 9 (c) and (d), we vary b (number of keys on
each replica) given different q to plot preplication. We consider
c = 10 in subfigure (c), and c = 1 in subfigure (d), and set
node density d = 1 in both subfigures. Recall that preplication
scales with cdq!
(
bKn
Pn
)q
, and thus decreases as q increases for
bKn smaller than Pn. This is confirmed in the plots.
TABLE II
THIS TABLE CONFIRMS OUR RESULTS ON REPLICATION ATTACKS.
q = 1 (the upper two lines in Figure 9(a))
prob 0.7 0.9 0.97 0.99
c(b = 100) 2 4 6 8
c(b = 200) 1 2 3 4
q
√
c(b=100)
c(b=200)
2 2 2 2
q = 3 (the lower two lines in Figure 9(a))
prob 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.9
c(b = 100) 17 43 75 104
c(b = 200) 3 6 10 12
q
√
c(b=100)
c(b=200)
1.78 1.93 1.96 2.05
V. MATHEMATICAL DETAILS FOR
RESILIENCE AGAINST NODE CAPTURE
We now provide formal details for our results in Section II
on the resilience against node capture.
A. Deriving pcompromised
We consider the case where the adversary has captured
some random set of m nodes. As defined before, pcompromised is
the probability that secure communication between two non-
captured nodes is compromised by the adversary. With ρu
denoting the probability that two nodes share exactly u keys
in their key rings, for the q-composite scheme, Chan et al. [8]
calculate pcompromised by
pcompromised =
Kn∑
u=q
{[
1−
(
1− Kn
Pn
)m]u
· ρu
ps
}
. (19)
This result used in many studies [9], [23], [29]–[31] is
unfortunately incorrect as formally shown by Yum and Lee
[33]. With Aτ denoting the probability that the m captured
nodes have τ different keys in their key rings in total, where
Kn ≤ τ ≤ min{mKn, Pn}, a correct computation [33] of
pcompromised is as follows:
pcompromised =
min{mKn,Pn}∑
τ=Kn
{
Aτ ·
Kn∑
u=q
[ (
τ
u
)(
Pn
u
) · ρu
ps
]}
, (20)
where
Aτ =
(
Pn
τ
)
·
(
τ
Kn
)m −∑τ−Knλ=1 (−1)λ+1(τλ)(τ−λKn )m(
Pn
Kn
)m . (21)
Under a practical condition Pn ≥ 2Kn, from the result [36,
Proof of Lemma 2], it follows that
ρu
ps
=
1
u!
1
[(Kn − u)!]2
1
(Pn − 2Kn + u)!
×
{
Kn∑
u=q
1
u!
1
[(Kn − u)!]2 ·
1
(Pn − 2Kn + u)!
}−1
.
(22)
Substituting (21) and (22) into (20), we derive the exact
formula of pcompromised through
pcompromised
=
{
Kn∑
u=q
1
u!
1
[(Kn − u)!]2 ·
1
(Pn − 2Kn + u)!
}−1
×
min{mKn,Pn}∑
τ=Kn
{(
Pn
τ
) Kn∑
u=q
[ (
τ
u
)(
Pn
u
) · 1
u!
1
[(Kn − u)!]2
× 1
(Pn − 2Kn + u)!
]
·
(
τ
Kn
)m−∑τ−Knλ=1 (−1)λ+1(τλ)(τ−λKn )m(
Pn
Kn
)m
}
.
(23)
We see that probability pcompromised relies on the parameters
Kn, Pn and q, but does not directly depend on n. However,
(23) is too complex to understand how pcompromised varies
with respect to the parameters. To this end, we perform an
asymptotic analysis in the remainder of this section to study
pcompromised; i.e., we analyze pcompromised as n→∞.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that probability pcompromised is given by (20). From
Pn = ω(mKn) which clearly follows from condition (1) (i.e.,
m = o
(
Pn
Kn
)
), it then holds (for all n sufficiently large) that
min{mKn, Pn} = mKn. Thus, we obtain from (20) that
pcompromised =
mKn∑
τ=Kn
{
Aτ ·
Kn∑
u=q
[ (
τ
u
)(
Pn
u
) · ρu
ps
]}
. (24)
With q ≤ u ≤ Kn, we have(
τ
u
)/(
Pn
u
)
=
τ !
u!(τ − u)!
/
Pn!
u!(Pn − u)! ≤
τ q
(Pn −Kn)q .
Hence, from
∑Kn
u=q ρu = ps, it follows that
Kn∑
u=q
[ (
τ
u
)(
Pn
u
) · ρu
ps
]
≤
Kn∑
u=q
[
τ q
(Pn −Kn)q ·
ρu
ps
]
=
τ q
(Pn −Kn)q .
(25)
Substituting (25) and
∑mKn
τ=Kn
Aτ = 1 into (24), we establish
pcompromised≤
mKn∑
τ=Kn
[
Aτ · τ
q
(Pn −Kn)q
]
≤ (mKn)
q
(Pn −Kn)q = o(1),
(26)
where the last step uses mKn = o(Pn − Kn), which holds
from condition m = o
(
Pn
Kn
)
.
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C. Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorem 1 because PnKn =
Ω(n) and m = o(n) together imply m = o
(
Pn
Kn
)
.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
From the condition (3) (i.e., m = o
(√
Pn
Kn2
)
), we find for
n sufficiently large that
m <
√
Pn
Kn
2 =
√
Pn
Kn
≤ Pn
Kn
, (27)
so we further obtain Pn > mKn and hence min{mKn, Pn} =
mKn. Then (24) still follows here.
As in (24), pcompromised is expressed as a summation of
sequential elements with τ = Kn,Kn+ 1, . . . ,mKn. Clearly,
pcompromised is at least the element with τ = mKn; i.e.,
pcompromised ≥ AmKn ·
Kn∑
u=q
[(
mKn
u
)(
Pn
u
) · ρu
ps
]
. (28)
The right hand side of (28) is also a summation. We only use
its element with u = q. Then
pcompromised ≥ AmKn ·
(
mKn
q
)(
Pn
q
) · ρq
ps
. (29)
The expression of AmKn can be obtained from (21) by setting
τ as mKn, but it is very complex. We note that AmKn has
already been analyzed on Page 6 when we interpret (3). From
our analysis therein, AmKn equals
∏m−1
j=0 (
Pn−jKn
Kn
)
[(PnKn)]
m . Then it
holds for all n sufficiently large that
AmKn ≥
[(
Pn−mKn
Kn
)(
Pn
Kn
) ]m ≥ [(Pn −mKn
Pn
)Kn]m
=
(
1− mKn
Pn
)mKn (∗)
≥ 1− (mKn)
2
Pn
,
where step (*) holds because
• mKnPn < 1 holds from (27) for all n sufficiently large, and
• for 0 ≤ x < 1 and positive integer y, it holds that (1−x)y ≥
1− xy; see our prior work [35, Page 20-Fact 2].
In view of condition (3) (i.e., m = o
(√
Pn
Kn2
)
), we then have
AmKn ≥ 1− o(1). (30)
From condition (4), it follows that mKn = ω(1). Since q does
not scale with n, then mKn = ω(q). Therefore,(
mKn
q
)/(
Pn
q
)
=
(mKn)!
q!(mKn − q)!
/
Pn!
q!(Pn − q)!
≥ (mKn − q)
q
Pn
q =
(mKn)
q
Pn
q · [1− o(1)]. (31)
Clearly, (3) implies Kn
2
Pn
= o(1). Under (4) and Kn
2
Pn
=
o(1), we use [36, Lemma 2] to derive
ρq/ps = 1− o(1). (32)
Applying (30) (31) and (32) to (29), we establish
pcompromised ≥ (mKn)
q
Pn
q · [1− o(1)]. (33)
Since Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) implies Pn = ω(Kn), we know from
(26) that pcompromised is upper bounded by
(
mKn
Pn
)q · [1 +o(1)].
This result and (33) together imply (5); i.e.,
pcompromised ∼
(
mKn
Pn
)q
. (34)
By [36, Lemma 2], under Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) and Kn = ω(1), it
holds that
ps ∼ 1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
. (35)
Using (34) and (35), we obtain pcompromisedps ∼ q!
(
m
Kn
)q
. 
E. Proving Corollary 2
From Theorem 2, we have pcompromisedps ∼ q!
(
m
Kn
)q
. Hence,
to minimize pcompromised with respect to q in the asymptotic
sense given ps, we will minimize f(q) = q!
(
m
Kn
)q
. We derive
f(q + 1)/f(q) as
f(q + 1)
f(q)
=
m(q + 1)
Kn
. (36)
Given (36), we obtain the following results.
• If Knm < 2, as q increases, the sequence f(q) always
increases, as it holds from (36) that
for q ≥ 1, then f(q+1)f(q) = m(q+1)Kn ≥ 2mKn > 1.
• If Knm = 2, then f(1) = f(2). For q ≥ 2, as q increases, the
sequence f(q) increases, since we use (36) to derive that
for q ≥ 2, then f(q+1)f(q) = m(q+1)Kn ≥ 3mKn = 32 .
• If Knm > 2, as q increases, the sequence f(q) first decreases,
then increases, based on (36). In particular,
– If Knm is not an integer, then
f(1) > . . . > f(bKnm c − 1) > f(bKnm c) < f(bKnm c + 1) <
. . ., because we obtain from (36) that
• f(q + 1) < f(q) for q ≤ ⌊Knm ⌋− 1 < Knm − 1, and
• f(q + 1) > f(q) for q ≥ ⌊Knm ⌋ > Knm − 1.
Therefore, f(q) achieves its minimum at q =
⌊
Kn
m
⌋
.
– If Knm is an integer, then
f(1) > . . . > f(Knm − 1) = f(Knm ) < f(Knm + 1) < . . .,
since we derive from (36) that
• f(q + 1) < f(q) for q < Knm − 1,
• f(q + 1) = f(q) for q = Knm − 1, and
• f(q + 1) > f(q) for q ≥ Knm .
In this case, f(q) achieves its minimum at both q = Knm −1
and q = Knm .
To summarize, an optimal q to minimize f(q) and hence
minimize pcompromised is q∗ = max{
⌊
Kn
m
⌋
, 1} (if Knm is an
integer greater than 1, in addition to the above q∗, another
optimal q is q = Knm − 1). 
F. Proving Corollary 3
From Theorem 2, we have pcompromisedps ∼ q!
(
m
Kn
)q
, which im-
plies m ∼ Kn×(pcompromised/psq! )1/q . Hence, to maximize m with
respect to q in the asymptotic sense given pcompromisedps and Kn,
the optimal q is the solution to maximize (pcompromised/psq! )
1/q .
As noted in Corollary 3, the solution of q is difficult to derive
formally, but can given empirically by Table I and Figure 1.

PUBLISHED IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 14
VI. CONCLUSION
The q-composite key predistribution scheme is of interest
and significance as a mechanism to secure communications in
wireless sensor networks. Our work evaluates the resilience of
the q-composite scheme against node capture. We also derive
the critical conditions to guarantee network connectivity with
high probability despite node capture by the adversary, taking
into account of practical transmission constraints. These results
provide design guidelines for secure sensor networks using the
q-composite scheme.
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